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Varieties of Simulations
 In this edition of the Review forum, we revisit the 
theme of simulations in EU studies, drawing much on 
the contributions of EUSA’s interest section on teaching. 
In many ways, the evolution of the European Union has 
been paralleled by the proliferation of EU simulations. 
Thirty years ago, when the EU’s Common Market and 
governing institutions were still maturing and its mem-
bership was less than half of what it is today, few oppor-
tunities existed for students to participate in simulations 
of the European Union. Indeed, it is not clear whether 
there were any regular opportunities for this anywhere 
at that time. 
 Today, as with EU, much has changed. There is 
now a wide variety of EU simulations, and the number 
and type of these experiences seems to grow annually. 
Moreover, as argued in the articles featured here, it is 
widely accepted that simulations can enhance the ability 
of students to learn about the EU. Consequently, more 
faculty members are willing to include simulations in 
their curricula, and more institutions are willing to sup-
port these initiatives. Certainly students have embraced 
simulations as well, though we my not know whether 
they want to just want learn about the EU, or, more likely, 
that they are drawn to experiential learning because it 
is more enjoyable than traditional approaches to course 
material. In any case, participating in simulations aug-
ments what students know about the EU and sets them 
apart from peers who learn only through textbooks and 
lectures. Each of the articles below describes a differ-
ent type of EU simulation and emphasizes a different 
aspect of the simulation experience. 
 Rebecca Jones, who is co-chair of EUSA’s interest 
section on teaching, writes about her experience with 
an intercollegiate simulation of the EU, known as “Eu-
roSim,” organized by the Transatlantic Consortium for 
European Union Simulations and Studies (TACEUSS). 
This simulation takes place over four consecutive days 
and usually focuses on the EU’s legislative process in a 
particular policy area. An important feature of EuroSim 
is that it brings together 150 students from colleges and 
universities on both sides of the Atlantic and includes 
both undergraduate and graduate students. Jones fo-
cuses on the preparation phase of this EU simulation 
regarding her own students at Widener University. 
 John Scherpereel also writes about a simulation 
that takes place over several days, this one sponsored 
jointly by James Madison University’s Florence-based 
M.A. program in Political Science (for its concentration 
in the EU Policy Studies) and the University of Flor-
ence’s M.A. program in International Relations and 
European Studies. However, this simulation is aimed 
just at 40 or so students in both programs, occurs in 
multi-day segments across several months, and always 
focuses on EU foreign policy. Another prominent feature 
of this simulation is its inclusion of EU practitioners in 
the learning experience, which is important for both 
programs because of their focus on professional training 
for future diplomats and policy-makers. Scherpereel’s 
impressive article deals mainly with how and why this 
simulation is designed.
 Eleanor Zeff has much experience with intercol-
legiate EU simulations, but, here, she writes about 
case-teaching, which takes place in her undergraduate 
course at Drake University (but be conducted in any 
classroom). Zeff’s simulation is also unique because 
it deals with transatlantic differences and issues, par-
ticularly the sharing of European airlines’ Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data with the US Department of 
Homeland Security. This experience is divided into four 
stages of 15-25 minutes each, during which students 
simulate the actual negotiation between the US and EU 
on PNR that took place between 2007 and 2012. Zeff’s 
article focuses on how her scenerio helps students learn 
about real international relations and highlights how 
simulations can help students appreciate international 
differences concerning values, decision-making styles 
and culture. 
John D. Occhipinti, EUSA Review Editor
Preparing US Students for an EU Simulation
Rebecca Jones
Introduction
 Preparing students for effective and beneficial 
participation in an EU simulation can be challenging. 
Most US students are unfamiliar with the European 
Union at best and completely unaware of its existence 
at worst.  Participation in a simulation can increase 
cognitive knowledge (facts and figures) in a manner 
that is fun and effective.  However, how does one go 
about not only introducing the EU, but helping students 
arrive at a point where they are effective and engaged 
policy-makers within the EU simulation? And, given 
the potential difficulties in preparation, why would one 
choose to engage students in such a simulation?
 Simulations are viewed as a more effective means 
of teaching facts and theories than traditional lectures 
because, as Shellman notes, students are required “to 
analyze specific situations, reflect on their observa-
tions, confront problems, and develop their own ideas” 
(Shellman 2001: 827).  Dougherty agrees, pointing out 
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that simulations comprise “a number of broad practi-
cal and pedagogical goals” (Dougherty 2003: 240). 
Simulations currently in use in political science classes 
include everything from “Fantasy Congress” which is 
based on fantasy football or baseball games, to making 
political and policy decisions in the town of Camelot 
(Woodworth, Gump, and Forrester 2005), to playing 
the role of a Congressional representative marking up 
a bill in committee to writing and passing legislation 
for the European Union (see Zeff 2003).  As Watson 
noted, simulations and games “serve as vehicles 
through which the individual can practice communica-
tion skills, and experiment with strategies and tactics 
of social interaction.  In games the individual is able to 
learn about and try out new or potential social roles” 
(Watson 1975: 43).  When students act as lawmakers 
or business managers in a simulation they are trying 
out new and potentially future roles for themselves.  Ad-
ditionally, students benefit from participation in simula-
tions in ways not always as immediately noticeable as 
grades or class performance. It has been shown that 
affective learning is more than a beneficial side-effect 
of simulations, it is actually a desirable outcome (Jones 
2008; Jones and Bursens 2013).  
Preparing for EuroSim
 EuroSim is a cross-continent simulation of the EU 
involving US and European universities. Every other 
year it switches venues between the US and Europe. 
Participants range in age and experience from fresh-
men/first yearstudents (approximately 18 years of age) 
to master’s level law and EU policy students (about 23 
years of age and older).  The wide range of age and 
experience presents a challenge in preparation for 
those faculty members with younger students.  Many 
US students have not traveled outside of the US priorto 
participating in EuroSim (and a good number has not 
traveled more than two hours away from home).  At 
Widener University, many students are first-generation 
college students and are coping with the stresses of 
family expectations as well.
 Once the simulation is underway, faculty are no 
longer involved in any of the processes.  Therefore, 
giving students the most thorough preparation pos-
sible is necessary.  At Widener University, two courses, 
one full three-credit course (POLS 228), and one half-
semester, one-credit course (POLS 229), are used to 
prepare students for EuroSim.  The three-credit course 
is offered approximately every other year as students 
repeat their participation in EuroSim; the one-credit 
course is offered every year and is required for every 
student participating in EuroSim.  
 In POLS 228, the first half of the semester is cen-
tered on the historyand institutions of the EU.  Since 
US students are familiar with the concept of a federal 
government, the structure and relationship of the US 
national government and the states is used as a com-
parison case with the structure of the EU.  In this sec-
tion, the focus is on the powers of US states versus 
the powers and positions of the EU Member States. 
The focus then moves on to the institutions of the EU. 
Again, the comparison with institutions of the US federal 
government is made. In the attempt to find equivalent 
institutions across the two political structures, students 
come to realize the differences between the two sets 
of institutions.The next section of the course examines 
the contrast between the US constitution and the trea-
ties of the EU; how these documents distribute power, 
create institutions and bureaucracies, and change 
governing structures is examined.  Additionally, the 
policy process and treaty process are explored.  The 
differences in policy implementation at the level of EU 
Member States and US states are examined as well. 
Throughout the semester, random, in-class quizzes 
covering the readings are assigned, as well as short 
reaction papers.  These two types of assignments help 
keep students up-to-date on the readings and insure 
that any problematic issues are addressed early on in 
the process.
 The second half of the semester is spent studying 
the specific topic for EuroSim both in terms of the details 
of the policy or issue and what path it will take through 
the EU institutions.  The background questions, prob-
lems, and Member States’ positions are researched and 
discussed.  Students again work on reaction papers and 
have a take-home exam.  An additional project will be 
added for the Fall 2014 iteration of POLS 228.  Students 
will work in teams to create a country position paper 
and present their position on the issue at the end of 
the semester.  Based on results from presentation as-
signments in other classes, such an assignment should 
mean that those students participating in EuroSim will 
arrive feeling more comfortable speaking in front of, or 
to groups, while those students not participating will still 
gain a more “inside” view of the EU..  In addition, such 
an assignment provides students with an opportunity 
to gain experience working in groups, something they 
will have to do during the simulation.
 The one-credit class, POLS 229, is offered in the 
same semester s EuroSim, or immediately prior de-
pending on the dates of the simulation, and is treated as 
a topic-specific review course.  This course begins with 
a very quick overview of the structures, treaties, and 
policy processes of the EU; excerpts from basic texts 
are used (Ginsburg 2010, McCormick 2011).  Focus 
then shifts to the EuroSim topic and the specific roles 
students will be playing and the countries they will repre-
sent.  Students first submit a short paper discussing the 
topic area, problems, benefits and any implementation 
issues.  This paper should include a discussion regard-
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ing any Member Stateswho may ask for exemptions or 
strongly resist implementation.  The final assignment 
due before the simulation is a short paper on their alter-
ego role.  This paper includes the background, general 
political views, and opinions regarding the topic and/or 
policy for EuroSim.  The paper assignments are ordered 
this way so that students (hopefully) have a complete 
understanding of the topic, and then can figure out how 
their alter-ego will react and easily remain in character. 
This assignment also prepares students to respond 
to any counter-arguments that may be brought up in 
discussions during the simulation.
 About a week after the simulation, students are 
required to submit a debriefing paper.  This assignment 
asks students to review the preparation provided by 
the instructor, their own efforts at preparation, and an 
evaluation of their performance during the simulation. 
Students who are first-time participants have indicated 
that while they were more prepared than they initially 
believed, they also recognize that there was more 
they could have done themselves. This is borne out 
by post-simulation surveys which show that students 
do recognize when they have not adequately prepared 
(Jones 2008, Jones and Bursens 2013). Additionally, 
assignments such as the team presentations on indi-
vidual country positions are being added to the course 
at the suggestion of the students.  
So, how did they do?
 Participation in EuroSim opens up a broader under-
standing of the world and how it works for US students, 
many of whom have not traveled beyond a two-hour 
radius of their hometown.  When they are presented 
with the EU as a comparison to the US system, they 
appear to have an easier time grasping the differences 
between the two political structures.  While prepar-
ing students to successfully participate in EuroSim 
presents challenges both in terms of understanding 
and time constraints, the results can be eye-opening 
and are beneficial for content knowledge as well as 
gaining practice and experience with life-skills such as 
negotiation and group work.  Over the course of ten 
years of Widener University participation in EuroSim, 
student responses to debriefing questions have shown 
a great deal of similarity; they understand the workings 
of the EU far more clearly than without the simulation, 
and they realize that complicated topics can become 
understandable.
      Rebecca Jones
     Widener University
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Involving Policy Practitioners in EU Simulations
John Scherpereel
 Scholars of teaching and learning have shown that 
EU simulations can be powerful pedagogical tools in EU 
politics classes (Jozwiak 2012; Kaunert 2009; Switky 
2003; Zeff 2003) and in more elaborate simulation 
events (Jones 2008; Van Dyke et al. 2000). Regardless 
of their specific setting, all simulations aim to increase 
students’ understanding of complex political dynamics 
through role playing. Instructors who lead simulations 
routinely introduce their exercises by telling participants 
to disregard their personal opinions, predispositions, 
and biases; to learn as much as possible about the 
preferred outcomes, tactics, and resources of the actor 
or actors they represent; and to pursue their assigned 
actors’ preferred outcomes throughout the simulation 
- during formal debates, off-the-record talks, press con-
ferences, etc. No simulation can model reality perfectly, 
but all simulations strive to produce learning and growth 
through verisimilitude.   
 The desire for verisimilitude has led many simu-
lation event organizers to inform practitioners about 
their simulations and to invite “real-life” actors to their 
events. On the first day of the Mid-Atlantic European 
Union Simulation Consortium event ( http://www.wcupa.
edu/_academics/sch_sba/political_science/MEUS/
default.asp), for example, students representing EU 
member states visit “their” embassies for briefings 
and speak with personnel at the US Department State 
on issues of transatlantic concern. The West Coast 
Model EU (http://jsis.washington.edu/euc/meu) typically 
features a keynote address by a European diplomat. 
The Strasbourg Model EU (http://meu-strasbourg.org) 
involves day-one workshops with practitioners and oc-
casional meals or events with practitioners.
 In these and other simulation events, invited 
practitioners tend to leave simulation preparations 
and proceedings to faculty organizers and student 
participants. Simulation topics are decided without 
policymakers’ involvement. Position papers and amend-
ments are drafted without policymakers’ engagement. 
Negotiations proceed without policymakers’ monitoring. 
Viewed from one angle, this division of labor is entirely 
understandable. Real-life actors are buried in real-life 
business. They are not (usually) trained educators. 
Their closeness to the issues of the day may obstruct 
their appreciation for the broader learning outcomes 
that event organizers seek to achieve. 
 Recognizing these hurdles, organizers of an EU 
simulation in Florence have nonetheless designed and 
implemented a simulation built around steady, substan-
tive, and relatively deep relationships between students 
and policy practitioners. The practice of deepening ac-
tors’ engagement with the simulation is motivated by a 
number of hypotheses: first, that such engagement will 
increase the simulation’s verisimilitude; second, that 
such engagement will boost students’ appreciation for 
the forces that move EU politics; and third, that such 
engagement will help students to develop professional 
confidence and professional networks.
 For each of the last four years, James Madison 
University’s (JMU’s) Florence-based M.A. program 
in political science with a concentration in EU Policy 
Studies and the University of Florence’s (UNIFI’s) 
M.A. program in International Relations and European 
Studies have invited policy practitioners from Brussels 
to co-direct, along with program faculty, a simulation of 
EU foreign policy decision-making.
 The simulation’s culminating event is a formal min-
isterial meeting of the Council that takes place at Flor-
ence’s historic city hall (Palazzo Vecchio). This event 
generally occurs in late spring. By the time the Council 
meeting takes place, students have been working with 
each other and with the policy practitioners for months. 
In general, the simulation involves approximately 40 
students—half from JMU, half from UNIFI.
 Faculty members and the practitioners--two long-
serving professional staff members of the European 
Parliament--typically begin discussing potential simu-
lation scenarios one year before the ministerial event 
in late spring. Because of the nature of the involved 
programs (the JMU program seeks to train transatlan-
tic diplomatic, political, and economic professionals; 
the UNIFI program seeks to train diplomats, scholars, 
and EU policy professionals) and the expertise of the 
involved practitioners, the topics always revolve around 
EU foreign policy. 
 Organizers have been careful to construct scenarios 
that involve multiple EU foreign policy instruments and 
multiple decision-making rules. In addition to high-poli-
tics debates that require unanimity (e.g., debates about 
CSDP missions), for example, they have also placed 
issues covering trade, development cooperation, and 
financial/technical assistance on simulation agendas. 
The latter areas are governed, respectively, by Articles 
207, 209, and 212 TFEU and are subject to the ordinary 
legislative procedure. In addition, issues related to ac-
cession (Article 49 TEU, requiring EP consent) have 
been placed on simulation agendas.
 Once the simulation topics have been decided, 
faculty organizers and practitioners develop a plan for 
three to four simulation sessions (this number includes 
the final ministerial session; the precise number of 
sessions depends on practitioners’ availability), spread 
across four to seven months. Specific learning goals 
and simulation activities vary from one session to the 
next, as described below. According to Kaunert (2009, 
pp. 255), one of the most important pedagogical payoffs 
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of well-designed simulations is cumulative learning, 
where “a subject is introduced repeatedly and with an 
increase in the levels of complexity during the course 
of study, which leads to an increase in the student’s 
capacity to remember the knowledge presented.” In 
2012-2013, for example, the simulation involved three 
discrete sessions of intense practitioner-student contact 
(January, March, and May).  
 In the days leading up to the January session, fac-
ulty organizers covered information regarding the EP’s 
role in scrutinizing and “nuancing” cooperation agree-
ments with third countries and divided students into EP 
party groups; each party group contained multiple JMU 
students and multiple UNIFI students. Practitioners also 
circulated, prior to the session, an actual draft motion 
for a resolution on the conclusion of a partnership and 
cooperation between the EU and Turkmenistan, and 
students researched “their” party group’s positions on 
Turkmenistan, human rights abuses, and other relevant 
issues. During the session, students assembled in 
party groups and crafted specific amendments to the 
draft motion. The practitioners, who had both worked 
on the actual dossier in question, worked closely with 
each party group, circulating from one to the next. In 
tandem with the faculty organizers, they concluded the 
session by giving feedback on the content and the form 
of the amendments that various groups proposed. They 
also laid out the general “plan of attack” for the second 
simulation session, which would take place in March.
 The second session in March sought to produce 
a cumulative effect. As before, students were divided 
into teams representing EP party groups (party group 
memberships were “shaken up,” but they continued 
to consist of students from both universities), and a 
draft document was distributed. This time, students 
considered a Commission proposal for a new instru-
ment of foreign policy (the “partnership instrument”); 
this proposal was subject to the ordinary legislative 
procedure. In this round, student groups met before 
their session with the practitioners to propose amend-
ments to the proposal. Then, during the session, they 
negotiated with each other over the amendments (the 
parliamentary process was overseen by a student serv-
ing as committee chair). By the end of the debate, they 
had produced and voted on a final amended document. 
In the first session, practitioners’ feedback had focused 
on the form and content of amendments. In the second 
session, feedback focused on negotiation tactics and 
(to a lesser extent) parliamentary procedure. Practitio-
ners and faculty organizers concluded by remarking 
on the differences between the outcome reached by 
the students and the real-life negotiation outcome and 
engaged students in conversations about factors that 
might explain those differences.
 The final session of the 2013 simulation took place 
over two days in the spring. Unlike the first two ses-
sions, where students had played the roles of MEPs, 
most students in the final session played Council roles. 
Here, two students (one JMU, one UNIFI) represented 
the High Representative/Vice President of the Commis-
sion (the HRVP). One student (JMU) represented the 
Commissioner for Enlargement and the ENP; another 
(UNIFI) represented the Commissioner for International 
Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, and Crisis Response. 
All other students were divided into fourteen 2-member 
country teams, each consisting of one JMU student 
and one UNIFI student. In the weeks preceding the 
final session, organizers distributed materials related 
to three dossiers—one on the dialogue between Serbia 
and Kosovo, the second on Ukraine’s progress toward 
meeting criteria necessary to sign an Association Agree-
ment, and the third on the crisis in Syria and related 
refugee issues in surrounding countries. Students also 
received a draft Council press release with specific 
draft wording regarding the Council’s position on the 
three dossiers. In the days preceding the final session, 
student groups tackled the background documents, 
drafted amendments to the Council’s conclusions, 
and wrote actor-specific strategic plans that presented 
their approach to (and appreciation of the relationships 
among) the three dossiers. On the first day of the final 
session, each student group met individually with the 
practitioners and received substantive feedback on their 
draft amendments and strategic documents; after their 
meetings with the line commissioners and the member 
states, the practitioners spent extra time with the HRVP 
(who had been meeting with the member states during 
the bilateral practitioner-student meetings) to discuss 
the distribution of opinion and strategies for seeking 
consensus. On the final day of the final session, the 
HRVP oversaw a vigorous debate in Palazzo Vecchio’s 
Salone dei Duecento, and faculty and practitioners 
debriefed with students.   
 Like most simulations, the Florence simulation 
involves major investments of time and energy. Co-
ordination of multi-institution simulation events is a 
notoriously laborious business, which is further com-
plicated by efforts to coordinate with busy and mobile 
practitioners. But is it worth it? Do students get more 
from a simulation with heavy practitioner involvement 
than they do from simulations with limited or symbolic 
practitioner involvement? While colleagues and I hope 
to address these questions systematically in the future, 
preliminary evidence has been positive.  
 Following each year’s simulation, for example, 
students are asked to reflect on the overall simulation 
experience (including a self-criticism). In the previous 
two iterations, they have also been asked to discuss 
positives and negatives of the practitioners’ involve-
ment. Feedback in these fora has been overwhelmingly 
positive, ranging from general approbation (“no real 
negatives; I think this added immensely to the simula-
tion”) to more specific consideration (“they challenge us 
to think . . . not [like] students in a simulation but actually 
[like] political figures within the European Union”; “they 
know the way the institutions work and how the EU 
functions from a high level, so they push you to arrive 
at the reality rather than fantasize about how things are 
done”). We hope that deeper investigations will throw 
more light on the payoffs of this variety of simulation.
John Scherpereel
James Madison University
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Teaching The European Union in Action: 
Using the Passenger Name Records (PNR) 
Negotiations (2002-2012) 
Eleanor E. Zeff
Introduction: Using the PNR Case to teach the EU
 The Passenger Name Records (PNR) contro-
versy between the United States (US) and the European 
Union (EU) lasted from 2002 until 2012 and involved a 
large cast of characters, four of the five major EU insti-
tutions, multiple transatlantic negotiations, power plays 
among EU institutions and between the US and the EU, 
and demonstrated differences between European and 
American values.  This rich scenario provides a great 
opportunity for teaching the EU because it allows stu-
dents to see the EU and its institutions in action over an 
extended period of time.  Some criteria for choosing a 
case study to teach the EU include: an interesting current 
issue, pertinent in many parts of the world, a case that 
covers several years, so students can see development 
over time, and an issue involving several EU institutions. 
 Passenger Name Records contain information 
that airlines obtain from passengers. After the 9/11, 2001 
attacks in New York, the US Government thought hav-
ing more information about passengers coming into US 
air space would help protect citizens from future attacks. 
The US negotiated separate agreements with several in-
dividual countries but entered the PNR negotiations with 
the EU in 2002. The US had the backing of its executive 
powers and a clear line of command. The EU was inex-
perienced at negotiating as a unified entity, and its institu-
tions, new and untried, each tried to demonstrate power. 
The State Department and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) were the main actors for the US.  The 
Commission represented the EU at the negotiating table, 
but due to the complex nature of the EU’s organization, 
it had to gain approval from the other EU institutions to 
ratify agreements. Agreements between the EU and the 
US were negotiated in 2002, 2004 and 2007, but only 
ratified by both sides in 2012. 
The Teaching Plan and Using Case Studies to 
Teach the EU
 When students start the simulation, they gener-
ally have little knowledge about how the EU functions as 
a “supranational” organization. They prepare by reading 
basic texts on the EU or chapters in books on European 
politics.  Their closest comparisons to the EU are the UN 
and the US.1  Initial questionnaires indicate students do 
not understand the powers of the EU’s member states or 
the EU institutions, nor do they comprehend how they in-
teract with each other or with the 28 member states. Stu-
dents know only the minimal about relations and negotia-
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tions between the EU and the US.  They are surprised 
to see differences in values, as reflected in different 
policies. A preliminary paper is due at the beginning 
of the debate and is designed to assure that students 
have enough information about the case and the EU 
institutions to contribute to the simulation.  
 Three agreements negotiated between 2002 
and 2007 formed the basis for “Power Plays” a 2008 
PEW case study of the EU/US PNR negotiations.2   The 
case study covers “the performance of the European 
Union’s institutions as they interact and compete for 
dominance within the EU, and then as they negotiate 
with the US ----with the goal to protect against terror-
ism.”3  The PNR case was ideal to teach about the EU 
as it showcased changing transatlantic relations and 
evolving EU institutional functions up through 2007.4 
The “Power Plays” case study has a simulation for-
mat, where students divide into groups and play the 
parts of major institutions such as the US Department 
of Homeland Security and the EU Commission. It also 
contains appendices with details about each institu-
tion and a chronology of events,5  starting in 2001 and 
continuing through the 2007 PNR Interim Agreement. 
Most of the EU institutions, including its rotating Presi-
dency, were involved in these PNR negotiations.  Al-
though the US felt that it made significant compromis-
es by the time of the 2007 Agreement, the Europeans 
saw little improvement. New negotiations were neces-
sary, and an addendum to the 2007 case, containing 
information about PNR negotiations held from 2007 to 
2012, now exists for use in class simulations.
 To bring the EU to life, techniques from the 
manual “The ABCs of Case Teaching”6  were used, 
and examples from simulation models,7  and active 
learning exercises were included. The purpose is to 
get everyone involved in discussion because they are 
playing a role.  Cases are useful teaching devises “be-
cause they tell the stories about events and problems 
so that students can better experience the complexi-
ties, ambiguities, and uncertainties confronted by the 
original participants in the case.”8  Using the PNR case 
study to teach the EU appears to encourage students 
to find pertinent information about the EU, identify 
problems faced by the actors, and more clearly define 
the contexts of these actors’ actions.  Students have 
a directed goal for research, and they have to learn to 
gather information that will help them play their spe-
cific parts better.9   Students say, and studies support 
this idea, that when they have to act a part, they read 
the case differently and get more involved in discus-
sions. They begin to think differently about how and 
why institutions and other actors make decisions. 
Playing the Game10 
 To prepare, students are placed on teams rep-
resenting the institutions (both EU and US).  They an-
swer a short questionnaire to gage their knowledge of 
the EU. The simulation is divided into 4 stages, each 
of which ends in some kind of agreement between the 
EU and the US.  The early stages are described in 
the “Power Plays” case study, and the last stage com-
prises the period between 2007 and 2012. Before the 
stages begin, groups meet together to decide on their 
goals and policy positions. There may be different EU 
and US institutions meeting during each stage. Stu-
dents discuss their goals and positions before each 
stage, keeping in character.  They need to know what 
their institution does, what power it has, and what role 
it plays in governing or regulating. Members of each 
EU institution group regularly consult the other groups. 
 Stage one begins in 2002 at the start of offi-
cial transatlantic negotiations between the US and the 
EU. For each stage, students need to be aware of the 
problems facing their institutions and what their institu-
tion or actor wants to gain from the negotiations.  Each 
stage has an allotted time period to negotiate (15 to 
25 minutes), and students must reach an agreement 
within that time period.  Conclusions of each stage are 
read in the form of press releases. The groups not in-
volved in the stage then voice their opinions to any 
agreements, basing remarks on what occurred and on 
their own platforms agreed during preliminary meet-
ings. Objections may also be presented as press re-
leases coming from the groups. There should be time 
allotted to objections about PNR agreements from 
outside individuals such as Sophie In’t Veld11 , a mem-
ber of the EP. At the end of each stage, a debriefing 
should occur12  to allow students time for periodic as-
sessment.  
 There are more intense debates between the 
EU institutions in Stage 2, and Stage 3 includes the 
2007 PNR Interim Agreement.  The European Com-
mission after approving the 2007 PNR Agreement 
submitted it for ratification by the 27 member states 
(MSs). However, in 2009, only 24 MSs had ratified it.13 
New negotiations became necessary, leading to Stage 
4, 2007-2012. “In 2010, the Parliament directed the 
Commission to, again, resume PNR negotiations with 
the United States.”14   Many changes had occurred 
when these renegotiations commenced in 2010. The 
US held elections in 2008, and the EU and the mem-
ber states ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, giving the 
EP co-decision powers.  In 2011, the EU and the US 
signed a PNR Agreement that the Council of Ministers 
approved.15   In April 2012, the EP finally ratified it, with 
409 votes in favor, 226 against and 33 abstentions. 
The new PNR Agreement strengthened privacy provi-
sions for EU citizens.
What students learn
 The early US proposals violated EU laws, and 
it was obvious from the start of negotiations, that the 
US had more negotiating power and a clearer chain of 
command, making it easier to negotiate transatlantic 
decisions. Acting out the scenario in stages, allows stu-
dents to see the changes in the negotiating power and 
strategies of both sides. They see that the US made 
compromises, and that the EU’s negotiating skills de-
velop. After simulation play ends, students participate 
in another debriefing discussion16 . A final paper is due 
at the end of the simulation and should also contain a 
debriefing section so students can reflect on the pur-
pose and value of using PNR negotiations to study the 
EU’s decision-making processes. Students have stat-
ed that they are surprised to discover that both coun-
tries changed tactics, and that each side confronts ob-
stacles that they want to overcome. Because they are 
actually playing roles, they witness more closely the 
changing negotiating techniques from the 2007 case 
study to the more recent 2011-2012 negotiations.
 The EU’s complex decision-making process 
calls into action its competing institutions, and stu-
dent comments indicated that they were surprised to 
see that decisions could be reached at all, despite the 
multiple actors.  Students gain a firmer understanding 
of how difficult negotiations can be when the partici-
pants do not have equivalent power, and when they 
see how EU institutions use their power. The case is 
useful for showing the complexities of the EU’s insti-
tutional structure and administrative practices, which 
reduced the EU’s negotiating power, especially in the 
early stages of the negotiations.  The case also shows 
the differences between the US and the EU in terms 
of values, decision-making style and culture. Student 
evaluations point out that the simulation helped them 
to better understood the time constraints on making 
decisions and the compromises that EU cabinet min-
isters and bureaucrats have to make to reach deci-
sions. Open-ended evaluations and surveys are good 
ways to assess student learning. Most surveys con-
vey that students feel that they learn better and re-
tain more through active participation in simulations 
even though some class time may be lost.17   Finally, 
students say they enjoyed the simulation experience, 
and they perceive that it helps them understand the 
dynamics among the EU institutions better than if they 
just had readings and class discussions.18 
Eleanor E. Zeff
Drake University
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European Governance of Digital Spaces: an Ex-
ploratory Analysis of Cyber Security and Cyber 
Crime Agencies and their Regulatory Potential
 Helena Carrapico 
Javier Argomaniz 
 In recent years, the European Union (EU) has 
come to view cyber threats and cyber crime as rel-
evant challenges to the completion of its Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice (European Union, 2013; 
Kroes, 2012). Given European societies’ increased 
reliance on borderless and decentralized information 
technologies, this sector of activity has been identified 
as an easy target for a variety of very different actors 
such as organised criminals, hacktivists, state agen-
cies or terrorist networks (Bendiek, 2012). Such analy-
sis has been accompanied by EU calls to step up the 
fight against unlawful online activities, namely through 
increased cooperation among law enforcement au-
thorities (both national and extra- communitarian), the 
approximation of legislations, and public- private part-
nerships (European Commission, 2012, 2011; Euro-
pean Parliament, 2012; Mendez, 2005). 
 Such impetus reflects both a perceived increase 
in Internet- related risks and the policy expansion of 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) it-
self (Rijpma, 2010). As the fastest growing policy field 
of the European Union in the past 15 years, the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice has increasingly been 
governed through agencies, whose traditional role has 
been to support Member States and to facilitate coop-
eration (Monar, 2006; 2001). Such role however seems 
to be currently evolving in the direction of a more cen-
tralist regulatory approach (Carrapico &Trauner, 2013; 
Busuioc et Al. 2011; Egeberg&Trondal, 2011; Ekelund, 
2010). In other words, EU institutions seek to promote 
a greater involvement of the agencies in the develop-
ment and implementation of Justice and Home Affairs 
policies (European Commission, 2008). 
 The literature on EU regulatory agencies has 
been paying attention to these bodies since the end 
of the 90s (Levi- Faur, 2011). It has mainly focused 
on two topics:The proliferation of EU-level agencies 
as a mode of governance (Dehousse, 1997) and the 
agencies’ autonomy and accountability (Busuioc et Al. 
2011; Wonka&Ritterberg, 2010). The arguments look-
ing at why the model of agencification has developed 
so rapidly throughout the EU have so far proposed a 
number of alternative accounts:(i) EU agencies have 
been created in order to provide a higher degree of 
professionalism, neutrality and credibility to the pro-
cess of policy- making, creating a distance between 
the agencies and political bodies (Majone, 2000, 1997; 
Dehousse, 1997); (ii) the expansion of agencification 
is related to a broader liberal trend towards ‘regulatory 
capitalism’, whereby agencies are considered to be 
the most efficient means of governing sectors of activ-
ity (Levi- Faur, 2005); and (iii) the growth in agencies 
can be related to an attempt on the side of the Euro-
pean Commission to indirectly increase its influence 
over policy- making (Kelemen, 2005). 
 The literature focusing on the work of these 
agencies has concluded, firstly, that the formal man-
date of agencies tells us very little about their actual 
autonomy and their day to day policy- making prac-
tices (Busuioc et Al. 2011), and, secondly, that the way 
agencies work and operate is likely to have an effect 
on various dimensions of governance (Ekelund, 2010). 
Finally, the literature on accountability has concluded 
that there is an important tension between the need 
for democratic accountability and the technocratic way 
of functioning of agencies, which lacks transparency 
due to the non- existence of solid frameworks for over-
sight (Busuioc et Al. 2011). Insights from this literature, 
however, have only rarely been applied to Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) agencies. As a result, most re-
search on Justice and Home Affairs agencies, such as 
Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, the EMCDDA, ENISA, and 
others, has tended to focus on their institutional de-
velopment, accountability procedures, levels of legiti-
macy, and operational contribution, rather than their 
potential capacity to shape policy (Busuioc et Al. 2011; 
Den Boer &Bruggeman, 2007; Deflem, 2006). 
 Bearing this background in mind, this short re-
view wishes to present a set of exploratory findings, 
which relate to our on-going work exploring the role 
of EU agencies in the governance of digital spaces 
based on two case studies: ENISA, the EU's cyber se-
curity agency, and the EC3, Europol’s cyber crime unit. 
The project considers the evolution of these agencies' 
activities in the area of cyber crime and cyber security, 
their positioning as experts in the field, the possible 
development of regulatory capacities, and the poten-
tial implications from this trend vis-à-vis the evolution 
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
 The case study on the EC3, Europol’s cyber 
crime unit, is based on previous work on Europol’s ca-
pacity to influence policy-making in the area of organ-
ised crime (Carrapico &Trauner, 2013; Parkin, 2012) 
and on recent fieldwork (Interviews in the Hague, 
November 2013). The EC3 constitutes the European 
Union’s most recent step in the fight against cyber 
crime. The new unit is largely a continuation of pre-
existing structures at Europol, albeitin a centralised 
form (RAND, 2012). It also reflects Europol’s attempt 
to become more competent in an area that is increas-
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ingly more demanding, thus enhancing the visibility 
and relevance of the agency for the cybercrime law 
enforcement community (interview with Europol offi-
cial, 2013). The EC3’s aspiration is to ensure a coordi-
nated response to a specific area of criminality, serve 
as the European cyber crime information focal point, 
provide support to Member States in their cyber crime 
investigations and promote meetings with cyber crime 
experts (European Commission, 2012).
 Although no direct references to policy-making 
are made in any official document, interviews reveal 
that there is an explicit ambition to influence policy, in 
particular by becoming the leading voice for the law 
enforcement community in cyber crime and by reflect-
ing at EU policy level the on-going national discussions 
and concerns (interview with Europol official, 2013). 
Such goals should not come as a surprise given the 
work already developed by Europol in other areas of 
activity. Although Europol is officially considered to be 
a platform for information exchange and for coordina-
tion of member states’ investigations, it has come to 
acquire a much more influential role in policy-making 
than what its legal mandate would suggest (Carrapico 
&Trauner, 2013). Europol has clearly evolved from the 
periphery to the core of EU policy-making in the area 
of organised crime, as illustrated by the growing influ-
ence of Europol’s Organised Crime reports on EU or-
ganised crime policies and initiatives (Council, 2012; 
Europol 2012). More specifically, the reports went from 
being perceived as being of marginal interest only, due 
to the quality of their content and methodology (Van 
der Heijden, 1996) to being the basis for the EU or-
ganised crime policy cycles (Council, 2012). Given the 
position achieved thus far by Europol, it is expected 
for the EC3 to follow a similar pattern.
 Where the second case-study is concerned, 
ENISA is the pre-eminent EU body in the field of cy-
ber-security. It is a relatively new player, set up in 2004 
by EU Regulation 460/2004 following a European 
Commission (EC) proposal (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2013). The agency, 
which started its operations in 2005, was established 
with the aim of improving the level of Network and In-
formation Security (NIS) within the Union and contrib-
uting to the development of a NIS culture in Europe. 
ENISA is, first and foremost, a centre of expertise. It 
aims to work as a platform to help European and na-
tional authorities to exchange and share information, 
know-how and best practices. Although it sees itself 
as bridging the gap between policy and operational 
requirements, ENISA is neither an operational actor 
nor does it deal with law enforcement. 
 The most recent mandate gives ENISA five 
main objectives: to develop and maintain high levels 
of expertise, assist EU actors in developing policies, 
support EU bodies and Member States (MS) in the 
implementation of NIS policies, strengthen European 
capabilities and preparedness to prevent, detect and 
respond to incidents in the cyber-space and, finally, 
foster public-private partnerships and cooperation 
(European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, 2013). 
 So far, ENISA has tended to work more closely 
with national agencies than European institutions in 
their most high-profile initiatives, including the coor-
dination of a number of pan-European cyber-security 
exercises to improve contingency planning and recov-
ery , and the organisation of a series of international 
conferences on cyber crises cooperation. These are 
seen within the organisation as important tools for 
building trust and sharing information. 
 Before addressing whether the Agency has ful-
filled a regulatory role, it must be noted that ENISA’s 
original 2004 mandate does in fact task the agency 
with helping the Commission in drafting Community 
legislation. Hence, Article 2 declares that one of the 
goals of the agency is to ‘assist the Commission, where 
called upon, in the technical preparatory work for up-
dating and developing Community legislation in the 
field of network and information security’ (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2004). 
So in actual fact, being a ‘policy shaper’ is a role that 
ENISA was expected to play from its conception. How-
ever, the Agency had other priorities during its first few 
years, mainly awareness raising, the promotion of best 
practices and the establishment of networks of exper-
tise in member states (Voudouris, 2005).Indeed one of 
the stated reasons behind the 2013mandate amend-
ment was tobetter align the agency to the Union’s reg-
ulatory processes and enhance its capacity to provide 
MS and European institutions with assistance and ad-
vice (European Commission, 2010).So there seems to 
be a clear interest from ENISA’s stakeholders to, not 
only provide it with more resources to solidify their po-
sition in the cyber-security arena, but also to formally 
invite the agency to have a stronger say on European 
cyber-security policies. 
 ENISA has willingly assimilated this policy en-
trepreneurship role. It has formally recognised that, 
the new mandate ‘foresees a more proactive role’ for 
the organisation in supporting the development of pol-
icy and legislation in this field (ENISA, 2013). 
 We must note that the drive to incorporate ENI-
SA into the Union’s policy and regulatory process had 
already started before the 2013 reforms. The 2010 
Commission proposal already highlighted some of 
these trends. It described how the Council had already 
started addressing ENISA directly in Resolutions and 
how the EP and the Council had assigned NIS-related 
tasks to the Agency in the regulatory framework on 
electronic communications (European Commission, 
2010). ENISA had also presented policy positions at 
EP Committees and participated in High Level Pan-
els and Working groups with representatives of EU 
institutions. In fact, the very same year the director of 
the agency confirmed that one clear way for ENISA 
to deliver added value was to provide guidance to 
the European Commission in the legislative process 
(UK House of Lords, 2010). Therefore, although the 
enhancing of its mandate allowed the agency to be 
better prepared to act as a policy-shaper, there was al-
ready existing evidence of ENISA’s capacity to inform 
decisions in the cyber-security arena.        
 All things considered, it is safe to say that the 
expectation is that ENISA will continue having a role 
to play in cyber-security decision-making in the near 
future. This can be easily gathered from official docu-
ments: the recent high-profile proposal for an NIS di-
rective does, for instance, call upon ENISA to work 
with the Commission and MS in the development of 
a Union NIS cooperation plan defining cooperation 
mechanisms to counter risks and cyber-incidents (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2013).
 A key difference between Europol and ENISA 
is that, in the former case, the agency has been able 
to exert policy influence beyond its narrow mandate 
by making its threat assessments a point of reference. 
Thus, although the EC3 may be a recently formed 
unit, its potential for policy shaping rests on the posi-
tion already achieved by Europol. In contrast, ENISA’s 
mandate included the possibility to participate in deci-
sion-making, but in practice this has never been one 
of its main priorities until recently. 
 The findings of these two case- studies are 
particularly relevant both for the cyber security policy 
field and for the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice. On their own, they provide an insight into cyber 
security decision- making and some if its drivers. More 
interestingly, however, is what these case- studies re-
veal in terms of the larger on-going trend in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, where the traditional 
model of the cooperation agency is slowly being re-
placed by regulatory policy shaping agencies. 
Helena Carrapico, University of Dundee
Javier Argomaniz, University of St. Andrews
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Drug Policies in the EU and 
Latin America Relationship
Alejandro Chanona 
 Cooperation against drug trafficking and con-
sumption has been gradually incorporated into the Eu-
ropean Union (UE)-Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) agenda since the mid-1990s. In contrast with 
traditional views such as the so-called “war on drugs”, 
which has focused on combating production and em-
phasizing drug interdiction, the EU-LAC cooperation 
considers illegal drugs as a social and security prob-
lem that requires a comprehensive policy response. 
 From the Action Plan of Panama (1999) to 
the Cooperation Program between Latin America and 
the European Union on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD) 
(2009), bi-regional cooperation has been based on the 
principles of shared responsibility for reducing both 
supply and demand. According with this vision, the pri-
ority areas of cooperation includes: 1) demand reduc-
tion; 2) technical assistance on capacity-building (po-
lice, customs, judicial action); 3) maritime cooperation; 
4) money laundering, 5) “drug precursor” (precursor 
chemicals) control; and 6) funding alternative devel-
opment projects, specially in the Andean region. Yet, 
bi-regional cooperation faces different constraints:  
a) The impact and the perceptions of drug traf-
ficking are very different in both regions: while in 
an important number of Latin American countries, 
drug trafficking is a national security concern (for 
example Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Peru), for EU members, 
drugs problem is related to public health and pub-
lic security. 
b) There is no a single voice, neither a com-
mon strategy on drugs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  Despite efforts to implement a re-
gional drug strategy, joint policies have not been 
implemented (Gratius, 2012). Some countries 
have chosen to focus on prevention and decrimi-
nalization (for example Uruguay with cannabis), 
although others privileged the traditional punitive 
approach (Mexico). 
c) Changing nature of drug trafficking from 
LAC in Europe. Cocaine consumption in Europe 
doubled between 1998 and 2008 and Europe ac-
counted for 24% of all cocaine users worldwide 
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in 2011 (UNODC, 2013). Spain and Portugal are 
the main point of entry for cocaine into Europe, 
followed by the ports of Belgium and the Nether-
lands. (EMCDDA, 2013). This situation explains 
why the EU has been prioritizing sub-regional 
and bilateral cooperation programs with Andean 
countries (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia as the co-
caine producers).  
d) The limited resources allocated to the bi-
regional projects.
The European Model: Harm Reduction 
 Around 14.5 million people are taking -or have 
at some time taken-cocaine; 11.4 million for ecstasy 
and 77 million cannabis (Trautmann, 2013). Currently, 
the main concern is the increasing use of synthetic 
drugs and the so-called “new psychoactive substanc-
es”. It is also important to note that, during recent 
years, the region has become a producer for cannabis 
and synthetic drugs. 
 The main responsibilities for drug policy and 
implementation remain at national level, however, 
the EU has been coordinating drug trafficking policy 
for 20 years in order to create a common framework 
that gives coherence to national strategies and en-
courage regional cooperation. According to the Eu-
ropean Commission, “illicit drugs are a major threat 
to the health and safety of individuals and societies 
in the EU” (European Commission, 2011). Therefore, 
for the EU members’ drug trafficking and consumption 
are related to public security (health and well-being). 
In 2003, the EU adopted “harm reduction” as a com-
mon principle for the drafting of the EU drugs strat-
egy for the period 2005-2012, which was adopted in 
December 2004. The result is that national strategies 
are increasingly oriented around this model preven-
tion, medical treatment and partial decriminalisation of 
drug use (Gratius, 2012).
 Hence, the European drugs policy aims to take 
a “balanced, integrated approach to the drugs prob-
lem” (European Commission, 2011). The European 
Council has identified two general aims in regard to 
drugs: 1) Complementing national actions in prevent-
ing and reducing drug use (in order to contribute to 
the attainment of a high level of health protection and 
well-being); 2) taking action against drugs produc-
tion, cross-border trafficking and diversion of precur-
sors. The EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 is structured 
around those policy areas, and three crosscutting 
themes: 1) coordination (Police cooperation and co-
ordination within EU, improving Europol capacities 
and border controls in the framework of the European 
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Area of Freedom, Security and Justice); 2) internation-
al cooperation (identifying European Neighbourhood 
Countries as priority and the need to address old and 
emerging trafficking routes such as West Africa); 3) re-
search, information, monitoring and evaluation (trough 
the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction –EMCDDA-) (EU, 2013).
 Even the main approach adopted in the region 
for reducing demand is the harm reduction model, 
member states still have different opinions about drug 
policy and priorities, and there are still gaps in the anti-
narcotics actions, specially among countries such as 
Italy, Spain and some eastern European countries, 
where criminal groups are more active. These differ-
ences make it difficult for the EU to adopt common po-
sitions in international bodies and in discussions with 
third parties, including Latin America. (Gratius, 2012).
Latin America War on Drugs 
 An assessment of the “war on drugs” in Latin 
America shows its limits: between 1999 and 2010, 
coca leaf and cocaine production decreased by 50% 
in Colombia, but has increased in Peru and Bolivia 
(during the same period the land used for drug cul-
tivation practically double in Peru); there has been a 
worrying increase in cocaine consumption in South 
America, especially in Brazil (the annual prevalence 
of cocaine use among college students stood at 3% 
and among the general population 1.75%) followed by 
Argentina and Chile; and drug trafficking is one of the 
main factors behind increased criminal violence in the 
region, particularly in Central America, Mexico, Ven-
ezuela, Brazil and Colombia. With figures of 100,000 
murders per year, Latin America is the most insecure 
region in the world. (UNDOC 2013, UNDP, 2013). 
 The complex problem of drug trafficking in 
Latin America has generated a variety of responses 
at national, sub-regional and hemispheric levels. It is 
important to note that in all cases, the need to promote 
comprehensive policies to combat this threat is recog-
nized, but historically governments have privileged the 
traditional model of combat through the use of force. 
For many countries in the region, drug trafficking is the 
main threat to national security and the armed forces 
have been incorporated into a variety of activities in 
the war on drugs: border enforcement, interdiction ac-
tivities, arrest of criminal leaders and public security. 
With their respective differences, Colombia, Mexico, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Brazil and Colombia are 
examples of these policies.  For other countries, like 
Chile or Uruguay, the drugs problem remains on the 
agenda of public security. Even, the Uruguayan Gov-
ernment has gone beyond to decriminalize cannabis, 
regulating their production and trade.
 At hemispheric level, since the 1980s Latin 
American countries have promoted regional coopera-
tion against drug trafficking in the framework of the 
Organization of American States. The first initiatives 
were intended to create multilateral mechanisms 
against U.S. unilateral policies, such as the famous 
“counter-narcotics certification”. In particular, empha-
sis was on the shared responsibility principle and 
promote regional counter-narcotics cooperation. The 
establishment of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Con-
trol Commission (CICAD) in 1986, the approved of the 
first Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere in 1996 and 
the creation of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism 
in 1998 responded to this logic (Chanona, 2011).
 The principle of share responsibility, the pro-
motion of multilateral cooperation and the commit-
ment to adopt comprehensive policies against drug 
trafficking, are common elements of the Hemispheric 
Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime 
(2006); the Hemispheric Drug Strategy (2010) and 
the Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs 2011-2015 
(2011). Nevertheless, until now the hemispheric coop-
eration against drug trafficking and consume has its 
limits, there is still a lack of mechanism of coordination 
and sub-regional initiatives have been playing a more 
important role against organized crime. 
Bi-regional cooperation 
 Latin America and the European Union share 
values and principles that are the core of the bi-re-
gional partnership.  On the issue of illicit drugs, both 
regions agreed that fighting against drug trafficking 
and consumption requires international cooperation 
and comprehensive policies.  For Latin America, the 
partnership with the EU on illicit drug issues is particu-
larly relevant, facing their strong relationship with the 
United States.
 As noted before, since the Action Plan of 
Panama (1999) both regions have been working in 
key areas of cooperation.However, when we anal-
yse the UE-LAC cooperation programs on drugs dur-
ing last decade, we can identify the pre-eminence 
of programmes with the Andean and the Caribbean 
countries, over the bi-regional ones.  For example: 1) 
the special trade preferences to Andean and Central 
American countries under the “GSP-Drugs scheme”; 
2) sub-regional programs, such as the Program for 
Combating Illegal Drugs in the Andean Community 
(PRADICAN), founding with 2.5 million €; and DROSI-
CAN with 3.23 million € to struggle synthetic drugs; 3) 
the alternative development projects in Bolivia (such 
as PRAEDAC, PRODEVAT and APEMIN I and II, that 
in total reached 37 million €) Peru (PALCAZU, with 
22.6 million €, and the Alternative Development and 
State Modernization Programme, with 10 million €) 
and Colombia (that has received around 126 million 
€ for peace laboratories and regional development) 
(Gratius, 2012 & EEAS 2014).
 There are only two programs at UE-LAC bi-
regional level: PRELAC, with 2.5 million €, and CO-
POLAD, established in 2009 and funding just with 6 
million €.  In fact, we can sustain that, more than a 
specific program COPOLAD is a broad framework for 
cooperation and coordination. Following the idea to 
promote an inclusive anti-drug strategy, COPOLAD 
has four components: 1) consolidation of the EU-LAC 
coordination and cooperation mechanism on drugs; 2) 
consolidation of the national drugs observatories; 3) 
capacity-building in the reduction of demand (preven-
tion, treatment, rehabilitation and harm reduction) and 
4) capacity-building in the reduction of supply (law en-
forcement and alternative development). 
 Thus, although in the discourse the EU identi-
fies LAC as “strategic partners” against drug trafficking, 
insists on the importance of strengthening bi-regional 
cooperation and promote comprehensive policies 
against illicit drugs; reality shows that the Europeans 
prefer sub-regional and bilateral agreements and pro-
grams, centred in controlling cocaine and synthetic 
drugs production and trafficking. In a study for the Eu-
ropean Parliament, Susanne Gratius (2012) revealed, 
that most of the EU projects in LAC are designed to 
reduce drugs supply. According to her data 102 out of 
135, are focused on reducing supply, whereas only 22 
are focused on reducing demand. 
 In a context which anti-drug policies are being 
evaluated all around the world, the European model of 
“harm reduction” remains a benchmark for Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean. Furthermore, the EU-LAC part-
nership could contribute to outline a new global drug 
policy. Though, any initiative would also need close 
coordination and cooperation with the United States. 
 It is also important to considerate that, be-
yond good will, the bi-regional cooperation on drugs 
faces “new” limits. The situation in many Latin Ameri-
can countries forces to delay the implementation of a 
broader strategy, so the European model could only 
“complement” the current policies in areas like citizen 
security. At this stage, the EU is in a period of lim-
ited resources and the priorities has changed: the new 
concern is the increasing consumes of synthetic and 
“new psychoactive substances”, as a consequence 
the European neighbourhood area has become a pri-
ority for EU international cooperation on struggling 
against drugs. 
Alejandro Chanona
National Autonomous University of Mexico
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Aid Effectiveness Meets Domestic Politics – the 
Case of the EU's Budget Support Policy
Svea Koch
 The EU's ability to formulate well-coordinated 
and coherent positions and policies is considered a key 
prerequisite for its effectiveness on the global stage. 
However, regarding most of the EU's external policies, 
and in particular the non-communitised policies, the 
EU faces the continuous struggle of achieving internal 
consensus and coordination among member states 
and EU institutions without losing sight of the effective 
external representation and impact of the EU. This is 
also true for development policy, for which the level 
of internal coordination between 28 bilateral policies 
plus the aid programme of the European Commission 
(EC) is often considered insufficient. Greater internal 
cohesiveness, however, is required in order for the EU 
to remain a relevant and effective actor in develop-
ment, in particular against the background of geopo-
litical and economic power shifts that decrease – or at 
least challenge – the EU’s potential influence (Koch 
2012). In this context, the degree of convergence be-
tween the preferences of the EU’s member states and 
the EU’s institutions has been highlighted as key for 
the EU’s actorness (Carbone 2013). More recently, 
scholars have also started to adopt a liberal foreign 
policy perspective to explain how the preferences of 
member states are determined by domestic political 
dynamics that hinder or support aid coordination. This 
article uses the case of the EU's budget support pol-
icy – one of the most prominent aid instruments – to 
show, firstly, how different preferences within the EU 
have led to severe coordination problems and, sec-
ondly, how effectiveness concerns have fallen prey to 
domestic politics and internal conflicts among member 
states and the EC.
 During the last decade, budget support – that 
is, the direct transfer of aid resources to a developing 
country’s treasury – has become a very popular, yet 
contested aid instrument. It originated as a result of 
critiques of traditional forms of foreign aid, which was 
disbursed mostly through projects. Over 40 years of 
experience revealed severe flaws of project aid and 
showed that it was too fragmented, creating par¬allel 
structures and high transaction costs for national ad-
ministrations in developing countries, without having 
a substantial impact on development. The 2005 'Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness' thus aimed at setting 
new principles for the provision of foreign aid. Accord-
ing to these principles, it was expected of donors to 
respect recipient countries’ ownership over their own 
policies, to align with the recipients’ development ob-
jectives, to use recipient countries' own administrative 
systems for channelling aid, and to better harmonise 
and coordinate donor aid interventions. Budget sup-
port has been considered most apt to implement these 
principles and to make aid more effective.
 From the outset, the EC was among the most 
dedicated supporters of budget support in the EU 
and considered it to be “the most effective instrument 
in development” (EC 2008, 3) as well as a suitable 
means to finance partner countries’ national develop-
ment plans. The perception of budget support as an 
innovative and effective aid instrument was, however, 
not shared uniformly by European governments and 
aid bureaucracies. Sceptics as well as the wider pub-
lic quickly denounced it as a "blank cheque to corrupt 
regimes" and as an instrument that bears high political 
and fiduciary risks. Over time, these different percep-
tions led to severe tensions. It became obvious that, 
within the EU, different preferences prevailed with 
regards to when and how to provide budget support. 
Some bilateral donors were very cautious and selec-
tive from the beginning (e.g. Germany) and highlighted 
the need to tie budget support to political governance 
issues – an approach the EC initially resisted. Others 
(e.g. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were 
strong supporters in the beginning, but they gradually 
reduced their use of the instrument and started to at-
tach stricter political conditionalities to budget support. 
In particular, these differences in policy became ap-
parent during times of political crises in developing 
countries. Some European donors suspended budget 
support as a political signal to the recipient country as 
well as to the European donor’s domestic constituen-
cies (e.g. Molenaers 2012). 
 The EC and individual member states, how-
ever, failed to coordinate a joint EU response in most 
cases, and thus sent largely inconsistent signals to de-
veloping country governments. First, EU donors could 
not agree on the appropriateness of using budget sup-
port to exercise political pressure. In many instances, 
the EC did not react in a similar fashion and continued 
to emphasize the aid effectiveness and the function 
of financing for poverty reduction over more political 
concerns. Moreover, as has been documented by 
several case study analyses (e.g. Faust / Schmitt / 
Leiderer 2010), even those member states that were 
in favour of withdrawing budget support in times of po-
litical upheavals reserved the right to act individually, 
often resulting in them not coordinating their actions 
sufficiently with other member states. The different 
preferences for budget support – and in particular to-
wards the perceived risks of the instrument – thus led 
to highly uncoordinated actions by the EU.
 Recent analysis of budget support provision 
shows that these different preferences and degrees 
of risk-averseness are not just randomly distributed 
among European donors but driven by at least three 
key factors of the domestic political context within Eu-
ropean donor countries: (i) partisan politics, (ii) the eco-
nomic context and (iii) bureaucratic interests (Faust / 
Koch 2014). Differences in party ideology are signifi-
cant in determining how sceptical or supportive Euro-
pean donors are towards budget support. The more 
conservative and right-wing a government is, the less 
budget support it disburses. This is also in line with 
findings from public opinion research that shows that 
conservative constituencies are more sceptical about 
the waste of foreign aid due to corruption in develop-
ing countries (Bauhr / Charron / Nasiritousi 2013). In 
addition, budget support suffers most in times of eco-
nomic crisis, as it is less visible and considered to be 
more risky than other aid modalities. The case studies 
of Germany and the United Kingdom furthermore sug-
gest that the institutional set-up of a donor's foreign 
aid system impacts on its preferences for budget sup-
port. In Germany, powerful implementing agencies of 
technical cooperation opposed the provision of budget 
support, whereas in the United Kingdom no such op-
position existed, which made it easier for the govern-
ment to disburse increasing amounts of foreign aid 
as budget support (Faust / Koch 2014). The analysis 
thus shows how political factors within donor countries 
shape donors’ preferences and the provision of par-
ticular aid instruments and undermine efforts for better 
aid coordination.
 Most importantly, these preferences not only 
have shaped individual donor policies but also impact-
ed on the EC’s budget support policy. Development 
policy is a shared competency in the EU, and mem-
ber states focus mainly on how they can influence the 
EC according to their own preferences and priorities 
rather than promoting joint European approaches 
that accept influence from Brussels over individual 
domestic development policies. Recent analysis has 
shown that, if preferences of member states are large-
ly homogenous, or if powerful coalitions are formed 
among members, the EC's policies tend to follow na-
tional interests rather than its own programmatic goals 
(Schneider / Tobin 2013). This is also apparent in the 
case of budget support, in which a large number of 
member states raised an increasing number of con-
cerns and exercised pressure on the EC to change 
its policy. On 13 October 2011, the EC published its 
revised budget support policy and introduced a num-
ber of important changes as part of a larger package 
of Communications outlining a new direction for EU 
development policy. Throughout the new policy, there 
is a very strong emphasis on the need to link budget 
support more strongly to political issues and to provide 
it more selectively. As with some member states, the 
EC now considers budget support to be not merely 
an effective financing instrument for poverty reduction 
and improving the recipient country’s public financial 
management systems; budget support is now explic-
itly more political and considered to reflect trust in the 
political leadership of the country.
 This is not to say that being more sensitive 
to political issues when providing budget support is 
wrong, as such. But it clearly comes at the expense 
of aid effectiveness concerns that have so far led the 
Commission’s policy. Several independent evalua-
tions showed that budget support tended to provide 
satisfactory development results, in particular with re-
gards to developing country government’s spending 
on social sectors and the improvement of their pub-
lic financial management systems (see e.g. Caputo / 
de Kemp / Lawson 2011). These evaluation results, 
however, did not influence actual policy-making, which 
relied more heavily on domestic political consider-
ations and the uneasiness of politicians in defending 
a potentially more effective aid instrument against the 
concerns of their core constituents. As outlined above, 
these national interests were apparent in a number of 
influential member states, leaving little room for the 
EC to follow its own original programmatic choice.
 The case of budget support is not only interest-
ing from a development policy perspective, but also 
relevant for wider discussions on the EU’s external re-
lations, as it shows how the external effectiveness of 
the EU can easily be undermined if domestic political 
and bureaucratic considerations and interests are at 
stake. A major stumbling block for internal EU coor-
dination thus not only consists of structural or techni-
cal impediments – due to, for example, the sheer size 
of the EU or the sometimes cumbersome procedures 
– but mainly of political motivations and preferences. 
As long as the EC continues to have only very limited 
power over coordinating member states’ policies (rath-
er than the member states dictating the EC’s policy), it 
is unlikely that effectiveness concerns will become the 
guiding principle for the EU's external policies.
Svea Koch, German Development Institute
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case demonstrates how people can express and even 
expand their citizenship across several layers of trans-
national political spaces. Her historical account of how 
citizenship can be created by the people themselves, 
offers invaluable inspiration for the potential develop-
ment of EU citizenship in our present days. Sheryl 
Lightfoot’s chapter on citizenship rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in Canada and the USA offers another bril-
liant illustration of the book’s central proposition that 
citizenship cannot and should not be viewed as a 
unitary construction that operates only at the national 
level. The various Indigenous citizenship models also 
show that EU citizenship is not an exceptional or novel 
concept different from any historical precedents. 
 The volume is edited by Willem Maas, a schol-
ar famous for his work on EU citizenship. One can 
readily agree with his claim that EU citizenship is the 
most exciting case of multilevel citizenship in the con-
temporary world. The different chapters of the book 
approach citizenship from an innovative perspective 
and offer a lot of food for thought for EU citizenship 
scholars. It is perhaps unfortunate that the different 
chapters do not address the consequences for EU citi-
zenship more explicitly, although such would presum-
ably have resulted in a wholly different book. In any 
event, the volume is highly recommended literature for 
anyone studying EU citizenship and can be expected 
to spark some exciting literature on the subject.
Nathan Cambien
University of Leuven
DeBardeleben, Joan and Crina Viju (eds.). Econom-
ic Crisis in Europe: What It Means for the EU and Rus-
sia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.  
 Economic Crisis in Europe explains how the fi-
nancial crisis moved from an economic crisis to a polit-
ical crisis, and how it affected the various regions with-
in Europe and Russia.  The interdisciplinary approach 
appeals to economists and to political scientists.   The 
editors’ deep knowledge of the region is evident in the 
expert scholars and relevant articles that they have 
assembled in this volume.  This review discusses as-
pects of the economic crisis and its relationship to poli-
tics in the EU, Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries in particular, and Russia.  Giving thorough 
attention to the new Member State post-communist 
countries and Russia, this volume assesses the crises 
at multiple levels: national, EU, and broader regional. 
The interplay of economics and politics at these levels 
affects the impacts of the crisis in the near-term and 
the long-term.  
 This timely book provides the wisdom of hind-
sight, taking into account the events that transpired 
in three phases from 2007 to 2012.  The crisis that 
began in the U.S. in the real estate sector in 2007 had 
fully taken hold in Europe after the collapse of financial 
markets in the autumn of 2008.  In the first phase of 
the crisis, governments responded to falling economic 
growth with liquidity and stimulus programs throughout 
2009.  These measures entrenched national debts, as 
countries struggled to foster upward growth in the face 
of rising unemployment.  In the second phase, the Eu-
ropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was estab-
lished in early 2010 and countries continued to use 
monetary policy to stimulate lending and economic 
development.  The third phase entered in full with the 
sovereign debt crises in the Mediterranean countries 
and Ireland.  This resulted in the downgrading of pub-
lic debt in 2011, as countries continued to struggle with 
economic growth in times of budget austerity.  By 2011 
surveys from most countries indicated declining levels 
of trust in EU institutions, and, as the chapter by Law-
rence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett explains, national 
elections that year favored the challengers ousting in-
cumbents from power.    
 In Part I “The Economic Crisis in the Europe-
an Union,” there is analysis of how the EU has dealt 
with the democratic deficit, the future of the project for 
regional integration, the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), and the potential for fiscal union.  Impacts of 
the crisis have been felt not only by increasing debt 
levels, but also by banking regulations as part of the 
new EU institutional governance provided by the Trea-
ty on Stability, Coordination and Governance signed 
by 25 Member States in June 2012.  There have been 
varying effects from the crisis on debt, budget, and 
employment policies across the region of Europe and 
Russia.   
 In Part II “The EU’s Global Role and Interna-
tional Institutions,” there are three policy areas that 
receive close attention.  They each have a dedicated 
chapter on the topics international trade, climate sus-
tainability, and the role of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  Crina Viju and William A. Kerr assess 
the mechanisms of the common trade policy in the EU 
that have contributed to the weakness of protection-
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Maas, Willem (ed.). Multilevel Citizenship. Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
 EU citizenship is often described as an “odd 
animal”, a sui generis kind of citizenship that is incom-
parable with any other forms of citizenship. Some au-
thors even take the view that EU citizenship is doomed 
to fail, precisely because it is not a homogeneous and 
unitary legal status conferred by a sovereign state, 
unlike other citizenship concepts. This compelling vol-
ume challenges the traditional view on citizenship and 
aptly demonstrates that varieties of multilevel citizen-
ship have always existed in different historic and geo-
graphic contexts.
 The book consists of eleven contributions 
grouped in three parts. It starts with three chapters 
that consider the challenges to national citizenship 
from the perspective of migrants and migrations. 
Amongst them is Luicy Pedroza’s contribution on the 
extension of voting rights to non-citizen residents, a 
phenomenon common in a number of countries. Pe-
droza convincingly argues that the traditional unitary 
conception of citizenship is wrong and that one person 
can maintain several allegiances to different state lev-
els, be they local, national or – one could add – even 
supranational. Somewhat unfortunately perhaps, the 
chapter does not elaborate on how the extension of 
voting rights impacts on the dynamics of (local) poli-
tics, citizenship and immigration policies in particular. 
 An analysis of the impact of local politics on cit-
izenship policies can be found, however, in the chap-
ter by Marcus Helbling, which figures in the third part 
of the book. Helbling’s analysis of Swiss citizenship 
policies poignantly illustrates some of the problems 
ensuing from a citizenship model which is contingent 
on decentralized naturalization policies. As such, it 
offers important lessons for EU citizenship, which is 
entirely dependent on the nationality laws of the EU 
Member States. The Swiss example may provide sup-
port for those who advocate some level of harmoni-
zation of Member State nationality laws, especially in 
times where some nationality laws are becoming more 
controversial, as the recent proposal to “sell” Maltese 
citizenship neatly demonstrates.
 The second part of the volume approaches 
multilevel citizenship from the perspective of “empires 
and indigeneity”. This part includes a highly origi-
nal chapter dealing with the so called “Su Bao” trial 
of 1904 in which revolutionaries were convicted for 
acts of treason against the Chinese state. The author 
(Elizabeth Dale) convincingly argues that the Su Bao 
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ist trends amid the financial crisis.  Matthew Paterson 
considers the place of the EU as a leader in global cli-
mate sustainability, addressing policy challenges such 
as the Emissions Trading System (ETS).  Patrick Con-
way analyzes the historical comparative advantage of 
the IMF as “a lender of last resort” and as a driver of 
reform in this economic crisis.  
 In Part III “The Crisis in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” there is a closer look at the CEE countries 
and Russia.  By 2010 the CEE countries were in a bet-
ter position with public debt, having had more moder-
ate debt positions at the start of the crisis, and their at-
titudes towards the EU were more positive.  In Russia 
the financial crisis in 1998 was pivotal, and following 
the sovereign debt default that year’s devaluation of 
the rouble brought about domestic economic growth. 
In the first phase of the recent crisis, the decline in the 
price of fossil fuels reduced the surplus from exports, 
a concern given trade dependence on demand from 
the region.  Rather than embracing the EU’s continued 
pursuit of economic liberalism, Russia has accepted 
protectionist policies that reverse the modernization 
strategy of several years prior. 
 Adeptly explaining how what started as an 
economic crisis led to political crises within the EU 
and Russia, the contributors have provided the rea-
sons for the differential impacts across the region, with 
particular attention to the CEE countries.  This allows 
for comparison between the countries still in transition, 
inside and outside the EU.  The varying impact and 
pace of recovery across countries makes it challeng-
ing to find a unified approach in the ongoing efforts for 
European integration and social cohesion.  With full 
recovery from the economic crisis still in the future, 
this book contributes to the literature on European 
politics and political economy by serving as a guide 
to navigate the recent events and their differentiated 
impacts across countries in the region.  
 
Beverly Barrett
University of Miami
Buonanno, Laurie and Nugent, Neill. Policies and 
Policy Processes of the European Union,The Euro-
pean Union Series.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013.
 Notwithstanding the existence of a burgeon-
ing literature dedicated to the European Union from 
its very inception, still few works have been devoted 
to delivering a thorough overview of EU policies and 
policy processes. By means of an extremely complete 
and lucid outline of the latter, the present volume sets 
out an innovative way of understanding – or teach-
ing – the key-features distinguishing the EU’s policy 
portfolio. To be sure, the contribution starts from a 
valid assumption, namely that this matter should not 
be approached in a monolithic fashion. Rather – in a 
hybrid political system such as the EU one, the con-
stantly evolving learning processes, alongside with a 
physiological extent of variation, shall be the points of 
departure for any kind of examination aimed to assess 
what the EU does, and how and why it does it. 
 Related to this, the authors happily decided 
not to rigidly divide the book into thematic sections: in 
fact, chapters fluidly follow one another, with a view to 
give a concrete idea of the complexity and the inter-
twined character of EU policy activity. 
 In particular, the first two chapters are dedi-
cated to the overall description of the EU’s policy port-
folio, not only recalling classic typologies such as the 
one famously advanced by Lowi , but also compris-
ing descriptions – equipped with smart “recapitulation 
boxes” – of the wide range of EU policy involvement, 
legal statuses and purposes (ch.1). Similarly, while 
classic theories of European integration are reviewed, 
a so-called “federal integration approach” is set out. 
In a nutshell, the latter draws on economic integration 
and federal theories: acknowledging the limitations of 
established mainstream political science-based theo-
retical tradition, this approach fruitfully considers both 
the compelling economic efficiency of integration and 
the nature of political and policy relationships in fed-
eral systems (ch.2).
 Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the most “didac-
tic” parts of the book, in that they look at the principal 
EU institutions’ roles and functions (ch.3) or at other 
important policy actors, such as European Agencies 
or the Member States’ domestic institutions. Much ap-
preciated the mention to the enhanced role of national 
parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty, or the rapid hints 
to sub-national levels of government – which really 
make the point of the multi-level polity adjoining the 
EU (ch.4). 
 Chapters 5-7 shall be considered as the core 
of the volume, since they cope with a 360° examina-
tion of the EU’s policy processes. Some distinctive 
characteristics are enucleated, underlining the ever-
increasing growth in number and type of decisions, 
policy processes and responsibilities – connected with 
consecutive EU enlargements leading to the inclu-
sion of states, which are more differentiated amongst 
themselves, both from a geographical and a cultural 
viewpoint (ch.5). Coming to the concept of policy cycle 
per se – and applying it to EU policy processes, the 
authors efficaciously manage to demonstrate how it 
eventually may resemble a “normal” political system. 
The latter impression lasts in spite of the considerable 
degree of variation occurring in response to diver-
gences across policy areas, both within and between 
the policy stages. Effective use of graphs and figures – 
coupled with that of the aforementioned “recapitulation 
boxes” – represent a plus, particularly for the student-
reader (ch.6). A classificatory system is added, sug-
gesting renowned categories for the sake of grouping 
the processes. In connection to this, the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) and its contested narrative 
is evaluated, locating it into a straightforward policy 
mode framework (ch.7).
 Completing the educational share, chapters 
8-13 describe the EU’s main policy domains – in an 
extensive, perhaps inevitably scholastic, manner. 
Chapter 14 annotates the latter part with an inspection 
of the budget: ça va sans dire, this timely contribution 
treats the issue from an up-to-date standpoint, includ-
ing appropriate reflections concerning the impact the 
Eurozone crisis has exercised – specially in terms of 
restrictions and limitations which the Euro area mem-
ber states have been exposed to. 
 Chapter 15, the last one, takes stock of what 
has been overall put forward – recollecting the theoret-
ical frameworks primarily depicted. Facing an increas-
ingly challenging atmosphere, chiefly vis-à-vis the 
long-lasting economic and financial crisis, the authors 
argue that the most valid analytic tool for exploring the 
EU adaptation processes is the federal integration ap-
proach, essentially because federalist arrangements 
seem to provide enough flexibility for allowing the sys-
tem to “bump” into the crises without collapsing. In-
deed, the outbreak of the crisis may have augmented 
some unanticipated side effects entailed within the EU 
integration path. The validity of the approach proposed 
in the volume is doubtless, since it takes into account 
the economic logics, but also includes political – even 
federal – dimensions of policy development. Further, 
federal theory is devised to explain constantly evolv-
ing processes – pointing out the possibility of power 
shifts between the federal government and its con-
stituent units, without losing sight of the horizontal re-
lationships among the latter. This differentiation – the 
authors clearly show – has become an important de-
fining feature in the European construction over cru-
cial policy areas. As a direction for future research, 
these sorts of wide-ranging approaches could serve 
as theoretical lens to look for patterns of policy-making 
and policy development in the post-crisis EU system. 
Alba Cicala
University of Siena
Adebajo, Adekeye and Kaye Whiteman.  The EU 
and Africa: From EuroAfrique to Afro-Europa. London: 
Hurst & Company, 2012.
 In recent years the external role of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) has been the subject of numerous 
books, theses and articles. Some of these works anal-
yse how the interplay between various EU institutions 
and actors may shape EU foreign policy. Another body 
of literature seeks to understand the mechanisms that 
allow the EU to diffuse certain policies and values 
beyond its borders, and the conditions that prevent it 
from doing so. A smaller group explores the multifac-
eted relationship between the EU and other regions of 
the world in order to investigate the role of the EU as a 
global actor. 
 Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of the 
Cape Town-based Centre for Conflict Resolution 
(CCR), and Kaye Whiteman, writer on African affairs 
and former European Commission official belong 
to the third group. In The EU and Africa: From Eu-
roafrique to Afro-Europa they take up the challenge 
of organising a “holistic and comprehensive assess-
ment of the relations of the European Union and Af-
rica” (p.1). The book tackles pressing issues that have 
shaped the interactions between the two regions from 
the late 19th century until today, such as trade and 
investment, military operations and economic partner-
ships. As suggested in the title, this uneven relation-
ship has evolved from domination and pure exploita-
tion of Africa’s resources to a sophisticated system 
where various states, regional organisations and in-
ternational institutions tackle issues of political, eco-
nomic and ethical impact for both regions. The book 
suggests that the EU – an ongoing project itself – still 
needs to define its role and its identity in order to be 
able to devise a coherent foreign policy approach to-
wards Africa. 
 The book consists of 22 chapters organized 
in six thematic parts. Following Whiteman’s thorough 
introduction, Part 1 provides a historical account of 
the relationship between Africa and Europe; part 2 
addresses the political and economic dimensions of 
regional integration in Africa, as well as the EU ap-
proach to the Maghreb, the Mediterranean and South 
Africa. Parts 3 and 4 deal with specific issues such 
as trade, development, and economic cooperation, 
and analyse the [unfulfilled] role of the EU as a se-
curity provider in different sub-regions of Africa. Part 
5 explores specific features of the relations between 
Africa, former colonial powers and European middle 
powers. Particularly interesting are the contributions 
of Anne Hammerstad’s about the Nordics, the EU and 
Africa and Douglas Yates’ text on the role of France in 
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the continent. Part 6 tackles the issues of migration - 
special attention should be given to Andrew Geddes’ 
chapter on the admission and asylum of developing 
countries’ nationals – and identity. Hartmut Mayer’s 
text on EU postcolonial role concludes the book.
 The editors do a remarkable job in bringing 
together contributions from diplomats, scholars, jour-
nalists, EU officials and practitioners from European 
and African political organizations and think tanks. 
The result is a comprehensive and informative work 
about how the relationship between the EU and Africa 
has evolved over time. The chapters follow a similar 
structure:  almost all the contributions provide an intro-
duction to the topic from a historical perspective and 
are concluded by normative considerations or future 
perspectives on specific dimensions of Africa-EU rela-
tionship. Different writing styles can be identified, but 
the chapters are well balanced and organized in a co-
herent and harmonious manner. The various authors 
manage to summarize a considerable amount of infor-
mation, to present it to the reader in a clear way, and 
to offer the public a critical appraisal of salient policy 
issues - Charles Mutasa’s text on the EU Common Ag-
ricultural Policy and Rob de Vos’ contribution on aid 
and partnership are good examples. The EU and Af-
rica successfully avoids the Eurocentric tone that is so 
currently present in this type of work, and is a worth-
while read.
 On the other hand, some crucial dimensions of 
EU-Africa relations are underexplored or overlooked 
in the book. This is the case of environmental protec-
tion, health, and fight against corruption, for example. 
Thus, by approaching a large number of issues, the 
editors make a choice not to engage in an in-depth 
analysis of each topic, but to identify and approach 
specific issues from a critical perspective. Although 
the book has an explicit empirical character, some 
theoretical and methodological considerations could 
have been included; there isn’t a theoretical chapter 
properly speaking, although some chapters refer to 
seminal works in EU external relations such as the ca-
pability-expectations gap put forth by Christopher Hill. 
A concluding chapter by the editors would have also 
contributed to the overall organization of the book. Fi-
nally, a table of acronyms would have made it easier 
for the reader to navigate in the “alphabet soup” of EU 
and Africa’s foreign policy institutions. Such aspects 
do not compromise the quality and the importance of 
the work, but may render it less attractive to PhD can-
didates who are in a more advanced stage of their re-
search, and to established academics. 
 Written in an accessible language and without 
extensive use of EU jargon, this comprehensive ac-
count of the relations between the EU and Africa will 
appeal most notably to early graduate students work-
ing on the foreign policy of the EU and its member 
states, regionalism in Africa and development-related 
issues. Certain chapters may also be used in under-
graduate and masters’ courses on EU foreign policy, 
inter-regional relations and Africa in the world as basis 
for group discussions. The book aims at a broad audi-
ence: foreign policy analysts and practitioners - diplo-
mats, think tank advisors and journalists – might also 
find Adebajo and Whiteman’s work particularly useful. 
This book not only contributes to the debate on the re-
lations between Africa and the EU, but also stimulates 
further discussions about the EU’s identity as a global 
actors as well as Africa’s role in an increasingly inter-
dependent world.
Tatiana Coutto
European Union Institute
Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., and Schimmelfennig, 
F.  Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in 
the European Union.  Hampshire and New York: Pal-
grave-MacMillan, 2013.
 This book occupies a gray area between text-
book and new empirical research concerning the pro-
cess of European integration.  It clearly lays out the 
three most commonly cited theories of integration (in-
tergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and construc-
tivism), while at the same time, further developing, 
and empirically testing these theories.  Although this 
volume is likely too advanced for all but the most so-
phisticated undergraduates, graduate students seek-
ing to better understand the major theoretical perspec-
tives regarding integration can easily utilize this book. 
Moreover, this work may be quite useful to research-
ers as it attempts to synthesize the major theories 
concerning the process of integration, and provides 
for a set of empirically testable expectations.
 Chapter 1 presents the basic concept of this 
volume; namely that integration is not monolithic, but 
rather that the “nature and degree of integration” is 
heterogeneous across policy areas and territory (p. 8). 
Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig propose that 
different types of governing bodies vary along three 
key dimensions – level of centralization, functional 
scope, and territorial extension.  According to the au-
thors, the levels of centralization, functional scope, 
and territorial extension actually vary within the EU by 
policy area.
 In chapters 2, 3, and 4, the authors delve 
deeply into the competing theories of integration.  It 
is these chapters that likely serve as most useful to 
students seeking to develop a sound understanding 
of existing theory concerning the process of Europe-
an integration.  That is not to say, however, that the 
authors merely rehash previously published ideas. 
Rather, they begin each chapter with an in depth re-
view of intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and 
constructivism, respectively.  In the remaining sections 
of these chapters, the authors logically extend these 
theories to account for differences in nature and de-
gree of integration across policy areas.  
 The authors contend that intergovernmental-
ism explains differentiated integration through “differ-
ences in interdependence and cooperation problems, 
state preferences, bargaining power, domestic ratifi-
cation constraints, and . . . autonomy costs and ben-
efits” (p. 54).  Supranationalism can explain heteroge-
neous integration through “variation in the intensity of 
transnational exchange between different sectors and 
countries,” as well as, “the capacity and preferences 
of supranational actors to promote their policy and 
institutional interests”  (p. 77).  The driving factor of 
differentiated integration in constructivist theory is “im-
perfect ideational consensus” across states and policy 
areas  (p. 99).
 In the next four chapters, Leuffen, Rittberger, 
and Schimmelfennig tested these theories.  Using ex-
tremely detailed, qualitative case studies, they exam-
ined integration across four policy areas, the Single 
Market, the Economic and Monetary Union, security 
and defense policy, and freedom, security, and justice 
policy.   This piece is extremely well done qualitative 
work, and does not suffer from any of the problems 
commonly attributed to small N studies.  There is sig-
nificant variation in the four cases chosen, and the 
cases show no overt signs of selection on either the 
dependent or independent variables.
 The authors point out that they began this work 
with the assumption that each of these theories can 
be useful in developing an understanding of European 
integration, and the findings bore out this assumption. 
In some cases, one theory was clearly superior in ex-
plaining integration processes.  For example, it is not-
ed that neither intergovernmentalism nor supranation-
alism provide for explanations as to why certain states 
opted out of the common currency.  Rather, construc-
tivism, with its emphasis on identity, proves to be the 
best explanation.  In other cases, 2 or more theories of 
integration performed equally well.  The authors noted 
that factors associated with both intergovernmental-
ism, and supranationalism, played important roles in 
the early integration of the Single Market.  
 Due to the relative traction that each theory 
provides, Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig ar-
gue that it is important to build a theory accounting for 
each of the examined theories.  They then turn to de-
veloping a synthetic theory of integration, incorporat-
ing ideas of intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, 
and constructivism.  
 The authors start with the basic contention that 
governments are the key actors in integration.  The 
preference compatibility of the governments in policy 
areas, the level of interdependence of states concern-
ing specific policies, and the politicization of those 
policies are the key forces affecting initial integration 
in those areas.  Once integration has begun a spillover 
effect leads to greater interdependence and calls for 
more integration.  If at this time autonomy and identity 
costs remain low one should see preference conver-
gence, and further integration.  If these costs are high, 
one should see differentiation or stagnation in integra-
tion.
 Clearly, the greatest strength of this work is the 
synthesized theory developed in the concluding chap-
ter.  This theory allows researchers to move beyond 
questions concerning the correctness of each para-
digm, and presents an interesting starting point for 
future empirical studies of integration processes and 
differentiation.  Readers are left with a set of theoreti-
cal expectations concerning the progression of inte-
gration.  This, in turn, leads to multiple research ques-
tions, such as, do particular contexts exist in which the 
effects of autonomy and identity costs are increased? 
In sum, this work is an interesting and enlightening 
study that highlights and attempts to explain differenti-
ated integration; at the same time it furthers research 
on European integration by presenting an improved 
theoretical paradigm.
Christopher J. Williams
Maastricht University
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